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COMMENTS
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS AND FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
The class action' plays a central role in the enforcement
of federal civil rights.2 Frequently, plaintiffs bring suit on
behalf of a class in order to end a defendant's discriminatory
or unconstitutional practices.3 Only rarely, however, does a
civil rights suit contain a defendant class action, designed to
end the illegal practices of multiple defendants. 4 Clearly au-
1. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class actions in
the federal courts. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see infra notes 69-70, 82-83.
2. Civil rights actions constitute the largest percentage of class action suits
filed in federal court. See 1984 DIRECTOR AD. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 486-88
(Table X-5) (38.6% in 1983; 37.3% in 1984).
Civil rights claims are raised under a number of federal statutes, the most
important being the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which
provides for constitutional claims against state and local officials, and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), which pro-
vides for employment discrimination claims against public and private employers.
See infra notes 40-41. This Comment focuses on § 1983 and Title VII class ac-
tions, but the analysis is equally applicable to cases involving voting rights, see 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973aa-6 (1982), or racial discrimination in employment,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
3. Civil rights class actions typically involve injunctive relief for the plaintiff
class as the primary claim. Ancillary claims for damages may be raised under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See infra note 40. Additionally, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 allows an award of back pay in employment discrimination cases. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). For a general discussion of injunctive and declara-
tory relief in civil rights class actions, see 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1776 (1972 & Supp. 1985).
4. A common defendant class action is one in which plaintiffs bring suit
against a class of semiautonomous public officials in order to challenge the consti-
tutionality of a state statute. Another type of civil rights defendant class action is
an employment discrimination class action in which the litigation is expanded to
include both a plaintiff class of employees and a defendant class of employers who
are linked by a trade or collective bargaining agreement. See infra notes 50-67 and
accompanying text.
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thorized by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 5
the defendant class action is a powerful, albeit uncommon,
procedure for vindicating constitutional and statutory civil
rights. 6
Defendant class actions provide two advantages over
single-party litigation. First, defendant class actions foster
judicial economy. 7 By consolidating a large number of par-
ties and defenses in a single proceeding, a defendant class
action prevents the relitigation of identical issues in multiple
suits. Second, defendant class actions enhance the enforce-
ment of substantive rights.8 A judgment against a class of
defendants ensures a uniform outcome for all plaintiffs by
imposing a single classwide remedy.9
Despite these advantages, certification of defendant
class actions under Rule 23 has become a source of conflict
in the federal courts.10 Almost invariably, civil rights de-
5. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added).
6. Outside the civil rights context, defendant class actions have been certi-
fied in a variety of settings: patent infringement, see, e.g., Technograph Printed
Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968), antitrust,
see, e.g., Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 668 (N.D.
Il1. 1983); Management Television Sys. v. National Football League, 52 F.R.D.
162 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, 301 F. Supp.
497 (N.D. Ill. 1969), securities, see, e.g., In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104 (N.D.
Cal. 1981); In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978), corporate
shareholder suits, see, e.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D.
177 (N.D. Ga. 1972), and land title claims, see, e.g., Cayuga Indian Nation v. Carey,
89 F.R.D. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701
(N.D.N.Y. 1980).
7. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
9. This Comment does not address the problems of administering remedies
in civil rights defendant class actions. In most cases involving equitable relief, a
single injunction or declaratory judgment will be effective against a class of de-
fendants, since the behavior of the individual defendants will have been judged
identical or highly similar. If, however, significant differences exist among de-
fendant class members, remedial action may raise new problems of administra-
tion. See Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 784, 902-06 (1978). It is unlikely, though, that a defendant class
will be certified at all if differences among class members are great. See infra notes
89-105 and accompanying text.
10. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of defend-
ant class certification under Rule 23, although in recent years the Court has en-
countered suits containing defendant classes. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (defendant class composed of contrac-
tors, trade associations, and union); Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979) (defendant class of directors of mental health and
284
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fendant class actions have arisen in litigation involving both
a plaintiff class and a defendant class-a "bilateral" class ac-
tion." Plaintiff class actions based on civil rights claims usu-
ally are certified under Rule 23(b)(2),1 2 which is applied
when equitable relief with respect to a class is appropriate.' 3
Because defendant class actions are certified in conjunction
with plaintiff class actions and because civil rights enforce-
ment is at the heart of the litigation, 14 most courts have cer-
mental retardation facilities); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (defendant
class of county clerks); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (defendant
class of state public aid officials); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per
curiam) (defendant class of wardens, jailers, and sheriffs).
Currently, an intercircuit conflict exists concerning the certification of de-
fendant class actions under Rule 23(b)(2). Among those courts that have ad-
dressed the question, the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have
ruled explicitly that a defendant class action may not be certified under Rule
23(b)(2). Thompson v. Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (6th Cir. 1983)
(defendant class of school boards); Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 854 (4th
Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981); see infra notes 158-62 and
accompanying text. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that a
defendant class action may be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2). Marcera v.
Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1238 (2d Cir.) (defendant class of sheriffs), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979); see infra note 150.
Rulings in the district courts have been equally mixed. Compare Doss v. Long,
93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("With only isolated exceptions, the courts
universally have allowed plaintiffs to maintain (b)(2) class actions against a class of
defendants." (citation omitted)) with Coleman v. McLaren, 98 F.R.D. 638, 651
(N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[Some cases] bend Rule 23(b)(2) out of shape to produce [the]
result [of certification]. Other cases . . . simply endorse and accept the policy
considerations to reach the same result. In this Court's view neither such ap-
proach is legitimate.").
11. See cases cited infra note 43.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); see infra note 70.
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note ("Illustrative [of (b)(2)
class actions] are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged
with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are in-
capable of specific enumeration."), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Advisory Committee Note]; 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02[2.--6], at 23-52 to 23-53 (1985) ("Rule 23(b)(2) was
enacted in part for the specific purpose of assuring that the class action device
would be available as a means of enforcing the civil rights statutes. . . . [T]he
discrimination or other deprivation of rights at issue will generally be applicable
to an entire class of individuals.") [hereinafter cited as MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE]; infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text. See generally 7A C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1776.
14. For a discussion of substantive law's influence on procedural require-
ments in the certification of civil rights class actions, see Note, Antidiscrimination
Class Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Transformation of Rule
23(b)(2), 88 YALE L.J. 868 (1979). See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 3, § 1771; 7A id. § 1776.
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tified defendant classes under subdivision (b)(2) as well. 15
Yet the reasoning of these courts has been lax, often ignor-
ing the requirements of Rule 23.16 Only a few courts have
read the requirements of the rule more circumspectly, limit-
ing certification because Rule 23(b)(2) is inapplicable to de-
fendant classes. 17
In part, the conflicting interpretations of Rule 23 may
be attributed to judicial inexperience with defendant
classes.' On a more fundamental level, however, the vari-
15. See infra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
18. Nevertheless, defendant class actions are rooted in the common law. The
historical antecedent of the class action-the English Court of Chancery's bill of
peace-served as an equitable procedure by which a plaintiff could bind a group
of defendants by a single ruling. See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EqourrY
200-01 (1950). Usually, bills of peace were issued against tenants for the pay-
ment of rent, see, e.g., How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch.
1681), or against parishioners for the payment of parson's tithes, see, e.g., Brown v.
Vermuden, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676), and in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, bills of peace were used as frequently against a group of defendants as
by a group of plaintiffs. See Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a
History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 880 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Yeazell, Social Context].
In Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853), the Supreme Court
first endorsed the use of a defendant class as a procedure for binding a group of
defendants who possessed common legal and factual backgrounds. Settling a
property dispute between two factions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the
Court stated:
The rule is well established, that where the parties interested are
numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, some of
the body may maintain a bill on behalf of themselves and of the
others; and a bill may also be maintained against a portion of a nu-
merous body of defendants, representing a common interest.
Id. at 302.
Moreover, American rules of equity and civil procedure have codified the po-
tential use of defendant class actions. Prior to Smith v. Swormstedt, the Supreme
Court promulgated Equity Rule 48, which provided in part:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot,
without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be
brought before it, the court in its discretion may dispense with mak-
ing all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient
parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of the plaintiffs
and the defendants in the suit properly before it.
42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi (1842) (emphasis added). Rule 48's effects were limited,
however, because judgments were not binding on absentees. Seventy years later,
the Court promulgated Equity Rule 38: "When the question is one of common or
general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for
the whole." 226 U.S. 659 (1912) (emphasis added). Replacing Equity Rule 38,
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ous readings of Rule 23 illuminate an inconsistency in the
rule itself. Rule 23 is designed primarily for plaintiff class
certification,19 and theoretical justifications for the current
wording of the rule reflect a bias toward plaintiff class certifi-
cation. 20 Analysis of the defendant class action as a distinct
procedural device is therefore essential.2'
This Comment explores the viability of defendant class
actions in the context of federal civil rights litigation. 22 Ini-
the original Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Cihil Procedure, promulgated in
1938, also provided for defendant classes:
If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it imprac-
ticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or
more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on
behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character or the right to be
enforced for or against the class ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (superceded), 308 U.S. 689 (1939) (emphasis added). The
current Rule 23, amended in 1966, has maintained the potential use of defendant
class actions in contemporary litigation. See infra notes 69-70.
19. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 190-207 and accompanying text.
21. As one writer has stated, "[N]oting the deficiencies of Rule 23 with re-
spect to defendant class actions, [commentators] have argued that the drafters of
present Rule 23 did not vigorously analyze the functions and problems of defend-
ant class actions within the context of the revised rule." 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.45, at 373 (2d ed. 1985). Indeed, defendant class actions
have spawned a significant body of commentary in recent years. See, e.g., 3B
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13, 23.40[6]; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra,
§§ 4.45-4.70; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1770; Anderson & Roper,
Limiting Relitigation by Defendant Class Actions from Defendant's Viewpoint, 4 J. MAR. J.
PRAC. & PROC. 200 (1971); Max, Defendant Class Suits as a Means of Legal and Social
Reform, 13 CuM. L. REV. 453 (1983); Parsons & Starr, Environmental Litigation and
Defendant Class Actions: The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 881
(1975); Williams, Some Defendants Have Class: Reflections on the GAP Securities Litiga-
tion, 89 F.R.D. 287 (1981); Wolfson, Defendant Class Actions, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 459
(1977); Note, The Juridical Links Exception to the Typicality Requirement in Multiple De-
fendant Class Actions: The Relationship Between Standing and Typicality, 58 B.U.L. REV.
492 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note,Juridical Links]; Note, Certification of Defendant
Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1371 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
COLUMBIA Note]; Comment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: Class Actions in Patent
Infringement Litigation, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 50 (1973); Note, Defendant Class Actions,
91 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD Note]; Note, Personal
Jurisdiction and Rule 23 Defendant Class Actions, 53 IND. L.J. 841 (1978); Note, Statutes
of Limitations and Defendant Class Actions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 347 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Statutes of Limitations]; Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A De-
fendant Class Action with a Public Official as the Named Representative, 9 VAL. U.L. REV.
357 (1975) [hereinafter cited as VALPARAISO Note].
For early commentary on defendant class actions, see Note, Federal Class Ac-
tions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 827-29 (1946) [herein-
after cited as Note, Suggested Revision]; Note, Action Under the Codes Against
Representative Defendants, 36 HARv. L. REV. 89 (1922).
22. The analysis in this Comment need not be limited to applications in the
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tially, the Comment presents an overview of the defendant
class action procedure and discusses its applicability to cases
involving constitutional and statutory civil rights. 23 The
Comment then examines the requirements for certifying de-
fendant classes and analyzes the conflicting approaches that
courts have adopted in this area.24 Finally, the Comment
discusses and criticizes Rule 23's treatment of the defendant
class action 25 and offers a joinder-based theory of defendant
class certification that attempts to justify the proper use of
defendant classes under the rule.
26
I. BACKGROUND: ECONOMY, ENFORCEMENT, AND
DEFENDANT CLASSES
Traditionally, class litigation has been a means by which
parties too numerous to gather individually in one forum
may be bound by a judgment after a named representative
has advocated class interests. 27 Although a rarity in modern
litigation, 28 the defendant class action can be, in many in-
stances, more effective than single-party litigation. By con-
solidating a large number of defenses in a single proceeding,
a defendant class action can encourage judicial economy and
prevent injustices that could arise from inconsistent adjudi-
cations of the same issue. This Part examines the effective-
ness of the defendant class action in promoting both
economy in litigation and broad injunctive relief in the civil
rights field.
substantive area of civil rights. The parameters defining the analysis are (1) Rule
23(b)(2) as a source ofjudicial uncertainty in defendant class certification, (2) the
influence of substantive law on courts' ignoring procedural limitations, and (3)
the inadequacy of current theoretical justifications for defendant class actions.
Because most suits falling within these contours have been civil rights suits, the
Comment draws upon civil rights cases as examples. The analysis may be ex-
tended to other substantive areas, such as securities regulation or environmental
protection, in which equitable relief is sought to benefit a plaintiff class.
23. See infra notes 27-67 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 68-166 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 167-206 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 207-21 and accompanying text.
27. See generally 7 C. WRIGr & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1751; Yeazell, Social
Context, supra note 18; Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part I: The Indus-
trialization of Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 514 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Yeazell, Group Litigation-Part I]; Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part
II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Yeazell, Group Litigation-Part II].
28. Cf supra note 18 (discussing history of defendant class actions).
[Vol. 33:283288
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A. Judicial Economy
An underlying goal of class litigation is the promotion
ofjudicial economy. 29 By allowing one large suit to replace
numerous single actions, a class action limits the number of
suits in federal court and conserves judicial resources. 30 A
defendant class action promotes judicial economy by ex-
tending over absentees the scope of collateral estoppel,3 1 or
issue preclusion, which prevents the relitigation of issues ac-
tually litigated and essential to the judgment of the first
suit. 32 If a plaintiff sues an individual defendant and wins,
29. See Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 349
(1978); see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.8 (2d ed. 1977).
30. Although they may promote judicial economy by consolidating a large
number of suits in a single adjudication, plaintiff class actions also may drain judi-
cial resources by fostering litigation that otherwise might not have been pursued
because individual transaction costs were preemptive. See Ford, Federal Rule 23: A
Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 501 (1969). Nev-
ertheless, a fundamental goal of plaintiff class actions is overcoming transaction
costs so that substantive rights may be vindicated. See Developments in the Law-
Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1353-71 (1976) (hereinafter cited as
Developments].
31. The basic rule of collateral estoppel is that the preclusion of issues may
not be asserted against individuals who were not parties to the previous action.
See generally lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13, $ 0.441[3], 0.41111];
McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 709-10
(1976). However, the long-standing mutuality doctrine, which required that indi-
viduals asserting collateral estoppel have been parties to the original litigation,
has broken down in recent years. Defendants absent from earlier litigation may
assert collateral estoppel against plaintiffs who have lost with respect to previously
litigated issues. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S. 313 (1971). Additionally, new plaintiffs may assert collateral estoppel
offensively against defendants bound in earlier litigation. Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); cf. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984)
(nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel does not apply in suits against United
States). However, plaintiffs still may not assert collateral estoppel against defend-
ants who were not involved in previous litigation without violating due process.
Thus, the usefulness of class litigation for binding additional defendants remains
compelling.
32. Collateral estoppel effects on future litigation may create statute of limita-
tions problems. If a defendant class is decertified, then plaintiffs may be unable to
continue a suit on an individual basis because of the statute of limitations. In
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), the Supreme Court
held that the statute of limitations tolls with respect to absent plaintiff class mem-
bers when the suit is commenced. See also Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462
U.S. 345 (1983) (statute of limitations tolls with respect to individual actions if
class decertified). However, courts have not directly addressed the issue of when
the statute of limitations should toll in defendant class actions. See Appleton Elec.
Co. v. Graves Truck Line, 635 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976
(1981). See generally 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 4.52; Note, Statutes of Limita-
tions, supra note 21.
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the judgment cannot be used to prevent the same issues
from being contested by other defendants sued in subse-
quent litigation. 33 But if a plaintiff prevails in a defendant
class action, the judgment binds all defendants included in
the class. 34
Callahan v. Wallace,35 for example, involved a challenge
to the common practice among Alabama justices of the
peace of retaining a percentage of the fee obtained in traffic
violation cases. Because the justices had pecuniary interests
in the cases, the practice was declared unconstitutional by
the United States Supreme Court in Bennett v. Cottingham,3 6
in which the Court affirmed a lower court decision enjoining
public officials in a single Alabama county from continuing
the practice. However, after the Court's decision in Bennett,
the state attorney general issued several informal opinions
stating that the Bennett decision applied only to the named
defendants. 37 Consequently, plaintiffs initiated Callahan v.
Wallace as a bilateral class action with a plaintiff class com-
posed of all persons tried for traffic offenses in the Alabama
courts and a defendant class composed of all justices of the
peace, sheriffs, and state troopers in Alabama.38 The court
upheld certification of both classes and issued an injunction
prohibiting all defendants from trying or bringing traffic
cases in the justice courts. 39 Because the suit proceeded as a
defendant class action, the plaintiffs avoided the burden of
multiple suits by binding all members of the defendant class
in a single adjudication.
B. Civil Rights Enforcement
As Callahan illustrates, in addition to promoting judicial
economy, defendant class actions can facilitate the enforce-
ment of constitutional and statutory rights. Claims raised
33. If the plaintiff loses, however, subsequent defendants could assert collat-
eral estoppel against the plaintiff. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
34. Stare decisis could bind the parties in future litigation, but plaintiffs still
would have to bring individual suits in order to prevent all defendants from acting
illegally. See HARVARD Note, supra note 21, at 630-31.
35. 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972).
36. 393 U.S. 317 (1969), aff'g per curiam 290 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
37. Callahan, 466 F.2d at 61 n.2.
38. Id. at 60.
39. Id.
[Vol. 33:283290
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under 42 U.S.C. § 198340 against state and local government
officials and under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196441
against private and public42 employers have been the basis
for bilateral class actions in which both plaintiff and defend-
ant classes have been certified.43
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the pur-
poses of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.
41. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Title VII allows injunctive relief, reinstatement,
and hiring with or without back pay to remedy unlawful employment practices. Id
§ 2000e-5(g).
42. Defendant class actions against public employers usually contain both
§ 1983 and Title VII claims. See, e.g., Thompson v. Board of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398
(W.D. Mich. 1976) (defendant class of school boards setting allegedly discrimina-
tory maternity leave policies), rev'd, 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983); Paxman v.
Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Va. 1975) (same), rev'd sub nor. Paxman v.
Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981).
43. See, e.g., Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.) (plaintiff class of
pretrial detainees seeking contact visitation rights; defendant class of county sher-
iffs), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979);
Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff class of persons fined in
justice courts for traffic violations and challenging judicial fee system; defendant
class ofjustices of the peace, sheriffs, and state troopers); Harris v. Graddick, 593
F. Supp. 128 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (plaintiff class of black voters; defendant class of
state election officials); Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Conn. 1984)
(plaintiff class of individuals challenging incarceration for failure to provide child
support; defendant class ofjudges); Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(plaintiff class of civil litigants challenging judicial fee system; defendant class of
judges); Leist v. Shawano County, 91 F.R.D. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (plaintiff class of
welfare recipients; defendant class of municipalities); Pennsylvania v. Local 542,
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (plaintiff class
of employees alleging racial discrimination; defendant class composed of contrac-
tors, trade associations, and union), aff'd mem., 648 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
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The clear advantage of using the defendant class action
procedure is that substantive rights can be enforced on a
wider scale than is possible through a single-party suit.44 A
defendant class action can bind a statewide class of public
banc), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Penn-
sylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ala. 1977)
(plaintiff class of disenfrachised men convicted of "assault and battery on the
wife"; defendant class of voting registrars); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 71
F.R.D. 398 (W.D. Mich. 1976) (plaintiff class of female teachers challenging ma-
ternity leave policies; defendant class of school boards), rev'd, 709 F.2d 1200 (6th
Cir. 1983); Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (plaintiff
class of welfare recipients; defendant class of township trustees); Redhail v.
Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (plaintiff class of state residents
challenging "permission-to-marry" statute; defendant class of county clerks),
aff'd, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
(plaintiff class of minors challenging commitment to mental institutions without
hearing; defendant class of state commitment officials); Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390
F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Va. 1975) (plaintiff class of pregnant teachers challenging ma-
ternity leave policies; defendant class of school boards), rev'd sub nom. Paxman v.
Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981); Dan-
forth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (plaintiff class of voters
challenging durational residence requirement; defendant class of state election
officials); Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1970) (plaintiff class of
individuals incarcerated for chronic alcoholism; defendant class ofjudges); Wash-
ington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (plaintiff class of prisoners chal-
lenging racial segregation in state prisons; defendant class of wardens, jailers, and
sheriffs), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). But cf Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (single plaintiff challenging antihomosexuality statute; de-
fendant class of district attorneys), revd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc).
An exception to the usual bilateral class action is a civil rights defendant class
action in which the federal government is the plaintiff. See, e.g., United States v.
Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682 (D.D.C. 1977) (defendant class of com-
mon carriers of freight bound by national collective bargaining agreement and
alleged to have practiced racial discrimination in employment); United States v.
Cantrell, 307 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. La. 1969) (defendant class of owners of bars and
cocktail lounges alleged to have practiced racial discrimination against military
personnel). However, a suit initiated by the federal government usually is
brought on behalf of a class whose members have been injured by the defendant
or defendant class. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323-29 (1980)
(Equal Employment Opportunity Commission not required to fulfill Rule 23 re-
quirements to maintain suit on behalf of class of plaintiffs). For example, in
United States v. Trucking Employers, 75 F.R.D. 682, 685, 693 n.7 (D.D.C. 1977),
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought suit on behalf of a class
of black and Latino employees alleged to have been injured by the defendant
class's discriminatory policies.
44. See Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (E.D. Wis. 1976)
("Where ... a statute with statewide application is challenged on the ground of
its unconstitutionality, allowing the action to proceed against the class of officials
charged with its enforcement is in accordance with the interests ofjudicial admin-
istration and justice which Rule 23 is meant to further."), aff'd, 434 U.S. 374
(1978).
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officials or a collection of employers who practice discrimi-
nation on a systematic basis. However, though in theory one
might imagine a defendant class so large that discriminatory
practices could be eliminated on a national or industry-wide
basis,45 in practice defendant classes are more limited in
scope. It would be unlikely, for example, for a court to cer-
tify a defendant class consisting of all employers in a certain
geographical area who are alleged to practice racial discrimi-
nation. All defendants might be guilty of discriminatory
practices, but the policies and the methods46 by which indi-
vidual defendants discriminate might be too dissimilar to
45. The only national, industry-wide defendant class action has been United
States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682 (D.D.C. 1977). In Trucking Em-
ployers, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit
against a nationwide class composed of employers and unions who were subject to
a collective bargaining agreement in the trucking industry. Specifically, the class
included as members all common carriers of general commodity freight by motor
vehicle who were subject to the agreement, employed at least 100 employees, and
had annual gross revenues over $1,000,000. The EEOC complaint alleged that a
pattern of racially discriminatory employment practices pervaded the trucking in-
dustry, running from hiring through assignment, transfer, promotion, and senior-
ity. Stating that defendant class treatment was especially appropriate in this case,
the court upheld the nationwide class. Id. at 686-94.
However, following the Supreme Court's decision in International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), in which a seniority system simi-
lar to the one in Trucking Employers was declared bona fide and therefore legal, the
class was decertified and the case dismissed following the modification of a con-
sent decree between the parties. United States v. Trucking Management, Inc., 20
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 342 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, 662 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
46. Two fundamental approaches to employment discrimination claims
brought under Title VII exist: "disparate treatment" theory and "disparate im-
pact" theory. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), the Supreme Court described the two theories of liability:
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favora-
bly than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment. ...
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims
that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups
but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity. . . . Proof of discrimina-
tory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate-impact
theory. . . . Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular
set of facts.
Id. at 335 n.15 (citations omitted). For a general discussion of the two theories,
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make class litigation appropriate. Individual defenses47
might differ, and even with a determination of classwide lia-
bility, individual practices might require individual
remedies.48
Therefore, defendant class members must be linked by
a common legal and factual bond.49 Employers bound by a
single racially discriminatory collective bargaining agree-
ment have been held to be an appropriate group for defend-
ant class litigation.50 More commonly, courts have allowed
suits involving a defendant class of semiautonomous public
officials charged with enforcing a statute challenged as un-
constitutional. 51 Suits involving public officials have con-
see 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 65.00 (1983); B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-12 (1983).
Multiple defendants could be liable under either or both theories, possibly
precluding the uniformity necessary for class treatment. Moreover, even if sepa-
rate employers were alleged to have discriminated under the same legal theory,
factual differences among different employees could make class treatment
inappropriate.
47. Defenses under Title VII correspond to the separate theories of liability
that the courts have developed. See supra note 46. Both factual and legal differ-
ences among potential defendant class members would defeat class certification,
since the named representative's defenses must be typical of the defenses of the
class. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
48. Courts can minimize the problem of individualization by limiting the class
action to certain issues or by certifying subclasses, breaking the class into smaller,
more manageable groups. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4); see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Local
542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp. 329, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (two
defendant subclasses composed of (1) all trade associations subject to collective
bargaining agreement with union, and (2) all contractor-employers subject to col-
lective bargaining agreement with union), aff'd mem., 648 F.2d 923 (3d. Cir. 1981)
(en banc), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Penn-
sylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982). See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
§ 1.42 (5th ed. 1982). Additionally, the court may decertify a class after finding
classwide liability and administer individual remedies. See Pennsylvania v. Local
Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 90 F.R.D. 589, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(after determination of liability defendant class decertified for individual hearings
on damages). However, unless the class itself is small, a more prudent method
would be to make certain that a class is homogeneous enough to administer a
single remedy against all members. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 72-105 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469 F.
Supp. 329 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (collective bargaining agreement between union and
trade associations and contractor-employers), aff'd mem., 648 F.2d 923 (3d Cir.
1981) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75
F.R.D. 682 (D.D.C. 1977) (national collective bargaining agreement among com-
mon carriers of freight).
51. If the public officials are under a unified authority, then a suit against the
authority rather than a defendant class would be more appropriate.
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tained a variety of defendant classes, including justices of
the peace,52 township trustees, 5" election officials,5 4 school
boards,55 county sheriffs,5 6 district attorneys,57 mental
institution commitment officials, 58  and correctional
institutions. 59
At the center of a civil rights defendant class action is a
public law or private agreement that links the class of de-
fendants and provides the basis for systematic attack by the
plaintiffs. Defendant class actions often have been used to
challenge the facial validity of a state 'statute.60 Additionally,
defendant class actions have appeared in complex institu-
tional reform litigation 6' in which broad injunctive relief is
applied against a defendant class in order to benefit a plain-
tiff class. In Marcera v. Chinlund,62 for example, plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the common practice
among New York detention officials of denying contact visi-
tation rights65 to pretrial detainees. 64 In order to end the
widespread practice, plaintiffs sought certification of a plain-
52. See, e.g., Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
53. See, e.g., Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
54. See, e.g., Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
55. See, e.g., Thompson v. Board of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398 (W.D. Mich. 1976),
rev'd, 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
56. See, e.g., Marcera v. Chinlund, 91 F.R.D. 579 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
57. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
58. See, e.g., Kidd v. Schmidt; 399 F. Supp. 301,(E.D. Wis. 1975).
59. See, e.g., Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-
judge court), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
60. See, e.g., Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ala. 1977) ("wife-beater"
disenfranchisement statute and provision of Alabama constitution); Redhail v.
Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Wis. 1976) ("permission-to-marry" statute),
aff'd, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(nonconsensual repossession statute), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1039 (1974).
61. The term "institutional reform" has been used to describe litigation in
which broad, prospective injunctive relief is sought to change conditions in large
public institutions such as schools, prisons, and mental hospitals. Synonymous
with "institutional reform litigation" are terms such as "public law litigation" and
"structural reform litigation." See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Fiss, Foreward: The Forms ofJustice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Special Project, supra note 9.
62. 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated, on other. grounds, sub nom. Lombard v.
Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979);
63. Contact visitation rights include the right to "shake hands with a friend, to
kiss a wife, or to fondle a child." Id. at. 1234.
64. Pretrialdetainees are prisoners who have not been convicted of a crime
but are held in custody to ensure their attendance at, trial. Id.
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tiff class composed of all pretrial detainees in the state of
New York and a defendant class composed of all county
sheriffs in the state who authorized the challenged prac-
tice.65 The court certified both classes and issued an injunc-
tion requiring all members of the defendant class to
implement plans for contact visits.66 By joining the two
classes in a single adjudication, the "double-edged class ac-
tion" 67 ensured a broad institutional remedy to end an ille-
gal statewide policy.
Thus, the defendant class action fosters two important
goals underlying class litigation: judicial economy and judi-
cial enforcement of substantive rights. By addressing in a
single adjudication a civil rights question involving multiple
defendants, a defendant class action prevents the relitigation
of identical issues and binds defendant class members to a
common judgment. Combined with a plaintiff class action, a
defendant class action becomes a potent tool for securing
constitutional and statutory rights.
II. THE PROCEDURAL CONTEXT: RULE 23 AND DEFENDANT
CLASS CERTIFICATION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the certifica-
tion and management of class actions in the federal courts.
Under Rule 23, plaintiffs bear the burden of meeting the re-
quirements of defendant class certification, 68 and courts may
certify classes only after a two-part test has been satisfied.
First, a defendant class must fulfill all four requirements
stated in Rule 23(a): the class must be too numerous for
practicable joinder; common questions of fact or law must
65. Id. at 1235.
66. Id. at 1238-41.
67. Id. at 1235. The Supreme Court vacated Marcera pursuant to its decision
in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531 (1979), in which the Court held that due
process did not require that pretrial detainees incur only restraints inherent in the
confinement itself. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979). On remand, the
district court in Marcera continued to proceed on a classwide theory to deal with
the unaddressed issue of a pretrial detainee's contact visitation with family and
friends. The court recertified both the plaintiff and the defendant classes and is-
sued a preliminary injunction to allow contact visits. Marcera v. Chinlund, 91
F.R.D. 579, 587 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
68. Carracter v. Morgan, 491 F.2d 458, 459 (4th Cir. 1973); Stewart v. Win-
ter, 87 F.R.D. 760, 768 (N.D. Miss. 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982);
Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 499 (M.D. Ala.
1976); Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp 420, 422-23 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
[Vol. 33:283296
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exist among members of the class; the named representa-
tive's defenses must be typical of the class; and the named
defendant must adequately represent and protect the inter-
ests of the class. 69 Second, a class action must fulfill the re-
quirements of one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b).70
Subdivision (b)(2), applied when equitable relief with re-
spect to the class is appropriate, has become the category
most often invoked in civil rights litigation. 7' This Part dis-
cusses the certification of civil rights defendant class actions
under Rule 23. After addressing some of the unique issues
presented by defendant classes in satisfying the conditions
of Rule 23(a), this Part explores the problem of categorizing
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracti-
cable, (2) there are questions of law common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides:
Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in ad-
dition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropri-
ate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with re-
spect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
any individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the in-
terest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature
of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
71. See supra note 13; infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
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defendant classes under Rule 23(b) and analyzes the differ-
ent approaches that courts have adopted in allowing or de-
nying defendant class certification under subdivision (b)(2).
A. Rule 23(a)
The Rule 23(a) prerequisites serve as reminders, as well
as formal requirements, that a class action must foster judi-
cial economy and guarantee due process of law. Numer-
osity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation-as the four prongs of Rule 23(a) are com-
monly known-attempt to guarantee that certified classes
will be both well defined and well represented. However,
the requirements of Rule 23(a) present thornier problems
for defendant class actions than for plaintiff class actions.
While the numerosity72 and commonality73 requirements of
Rule 23(a) must be fulfilled in the same manner for both de-
fendant and plaintiff class actions, the adequacy of represen-
tation and typicality requirements must be tailored more
carefully in defendant class actions because of the possibility
of a binding judgment against the defendant class: Since lia-
bility and remedy lie against all members of the class, the
72. No minimum or maximum has been set to determine the number of class
members appropriate for class treatment. Compare Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L.
Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971) (thirteen members in the defendant
class) with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (over six
million members in the plaintiff class), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.
1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Fulfillment of the numerosity requirement
will be contingent upon the facts of a case.
73. Rule 23(a)(2) requires only that there exist "questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class," rather than that common questions predominate as in a class
action brought under Rule 23(b)(3). See supra notes 69-70. In any case, justifica-
tion for class treatment under any Rule 23(b) provision will fulfill the common
question requirement. See Vernon J. Rockier & Co. v. Graphic Enters., 52 F.R.D.
335, 340 n.9 (D. Minn. 1971) ("the existence of common questions is implicit in a
finding that a suit is definable as a (b)(l), (2) or (3) class action."); see also A.
MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 25
(2d ed. 1977).
In a civil rights bilateral class action, the challenged statute or private agree-
ment provides the legal commonality and comprises the substance of the litiga-
tion. See Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 52 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("The validity of
the statutory scheme . . . , as it pertains to both classes, comprises the substance
of the action. . . . It is the same procedures [authorized by the statute] that form
the bond of legal commonality between the plaintiffs and defendants."), rev'd, 502
F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); see also HARVARD Note, supra
note 21, at 643-44 ("If the class action simply challenges the facial validity of the
law, as opposed to the manner in which it is administered or enforced, there is by
definition only one issue at stake perfectly common to all class members.").
298
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named defendant plays an especially important role in pro-
tecting the interests of the absent class members.
1. Adequacy of Representation
The adequacy of representation requirement of Rule
23(a)74 is designed to guarantee due process for members of
the class. Because absent class members are not present in
the judicial forum in which their interests are at issue, class
actions may bind absent parties only when their interests are
adequately represented. 75 The adequacy of representation
requirement is especially important in defendant class ac-
tions because of the potential liability of all members of the
class. 76
When interpreting the adequacy of representation re-
quirement, courts traditionally have required that class rep-
resentatives retain competent counsel and have interests
consistent with the interests of the class. 77 Because the
plaintiff in a defendant class suit names the defendant class
representative, 78 courts must carefully examine the plain-
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
75. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
76. As one court has stated:
[A] defendant class differs in vital respects from a plaintiff class, and
. . . the very notion of a defendant class raises immediate due pro-
cess concerns. When one is an unnamed member of a plaintiff class
one generally stands to gain from the litigation. The most one can
lose-in cases where resjudicata operates-is the right to later bring
the same cause of action. However, when one is an unnamed mem-
ber of a defendant class, one may be required to pay a judgment
without having had the opportunity to personally defend the suit.
Although we believe that the Rule 23 requirements of adequacy of
representation and notice to class members were designed to safe-
guard due process rights, we note the inherent difference in the na-
ture of plaintiffs and defendants in most suits and suggest that a
defendant class should be certified and such an action tried only af-
ter careful attention to these safeguards.
Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 81 F.R.D. 487, 489 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (defend-
ant class composed of union and employers).
77. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir.) ("Ade-
quate representation depends on two factors: (a) the plaintiffs attorney must. be
qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and
(b) the plaintiff must not have interests antagonistic to those of the class."), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). Usually, judicial inquiry into the competency of the
class representative's counsel is perfunctory, and courts rarely deny adequacy of
representation on the basis of inadequate counsel.
78. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 237 ("It is a strange situation where one
side picks out the generals for the enemy's army."). Defendant class members,
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tiffs choice: It may be in the plaintiffs interest to choose a
weak or ill-suited representative. This is a legitimate prob-
lem, especially when damages may be assessed against the
defendant class and variations in liability exist among the
different class members. 79 Nevertheless, regardless of the
remedy plaintiffs are seeking, the named representative
should advocate the class's interests out of self-interest. The
representative's potential liability is as central to the litiga-
tion as the liability of the absent class members. The named
defendant should assert her own position, and once Rule
23's typicality80 requirement has been met, this position
should coincide with the interests of the class. 8'
like plaintiff class members, often have little say in who the initial class representa-
tive will be. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684, 691 (1941). Of course, through intervention defendant class
members may seek representative status after the named plaintiff has selected the
initial named defendant. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363
F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973) (denying defendant class certification), rev'd in part
on other grounds sub nom. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), aft'd,
427 U.S. 160 (1976); Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941
(S.D.N.Y.) (certifying defendant class), rev'd on other grounds, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d
Cir. 1973).
79. The seminal case exemplifying the problem of a weak representative de-
fendant is Richardson v. Kelly, 144 Tex. 497, 191 S.W.2d 857 (1945), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 798 (1947). In Richardson, defendant class members protested an ad-
verse judgment because the plaintiff intentionally had chosen representatives
whose liability was small relative to other members of the class. As a result, the
named defendants offered only token opposition to the plaintiffs claims. Id. at
502, 191 S.W.2d at 859. For a more thorough discussion of the Richardson case,
see Z. CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 239-42.
In a civil rights suit challenging a statute or private agreement, a problem
similar to the one in Richardson is less likely because injunctive relief would bind
defendant class members equally. In more complex situations, however, such as a
suit containing claims involving damages or back pay, the adequacy of the named
representative could be more important because a relatively weak, or judgment-
proof, defendant representative might not advocate group interests sufficiently.
80. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
81. In Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1239 (2d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds sub nor. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979), the court stated:
Rule 23(a)(4) does not require a willing representative but merely an
adequate one. It will often be true that, merely by protecting his
own interests, a named defendant will be protecting the class.
Where . . . the legal issues as to liability are entirely common to
members of the defendant class, there is little reason to fear unfair-
ness to absentees.
See also United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 688 (D.D.C.
1977) ("In sum, where the court can fairly conclude that by pursuing their own
interests vigorously the named representatives will necessarily raise all claims or
defenses common to the class, representativeness will be satisfied." (emphasis in
original)).
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Additionally, the adequacy of representation require-
ment affects the issue of whether prejudgment notice of the
litigation must be provided to absent defendant class mem-
bers. Under Rule 23, notice is required only to allow class
members to exclude themselves from a class certified under
subdivision (b)(3).82 The rule does not permit the self-
exclusion of class members under the other categories of
Rule 23(b), and the rule leaves to the court's discretion the
question of whether notice to absent class members is
necessary.8 3
Although Rule 23 mandates notice only to classes certi-
fied under the (b)(3) category, it remains unclear whether
notice to defendant class members is constitutionally re-
quired. In Zablocki v. Redhail,84 the Supreme Court encoun-
tered the issue of a defendant class notice requirement, but
the Court skirted the issue by holding that the named de-
fendant lacked standing to raise the issue on appeal; only
unnamed class members could make the due process chal-
lenge.8 5 Nevertheless, fundamental fairness would seem to
require notice to absent members of defendant classes. De-
fendants should be apprised of proceedings in which per-
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall
advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the
class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether
favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclu-
sion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he
desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (individual notice, when
practicable, required under Rule 23(c)(2), and costs of notice to be borne by
plaintiffs).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides in relevant part:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may
make appropriate orders: . . . requiring, for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,
that notice be given in such a manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the pro-
posed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate,
to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise come into
the action . . ..
84. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
85. Id. at 381 & n.6.
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sonal liability is at stake;8 6 class members should not be held
liable by ajudgment of which they had never been informed.
Still, even if not constitutionally required, notice to ab-
sentees can aid representation of the class. Since inadequate
representation may jeopardize certification of the class, the
court must make certain that the named defendant has suffi-
cient resources and advocates proper defenses on behalf of
the class. Notice to class members gives the court a better
opportunity to assess the adequacy of the named defendant,
to foster additional representation by absent class mem-
bers,8 7 or to act sua sponte to appoint other repre-
sentatives.88
2. Typicality and the "Juridical Link" Test
While adequacy of representation is considered a cen-
tral requirement of class certification, Rule 23's typicality re-
quirement has been criticized as superfluous. Other
portions of the rule accomplish the same function.8 9 Never-
theless, whether interpreted as a discrete requirement or
merged with other Rule 23(a) requirements, judicial inquiry
into the typicality of defenses can provide a useful safeguard
against class heterogeneity9" and can aid in protecting the
86. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any pro-
ceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
87. See supra notes 78, 83.
88. See United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 694 (D.D.C.
1977); Z. CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 238.
89. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 73, at 26 ("[T]here does not seem to be any
function [typicality] performs that is not accomplished by some other portion of
the Rule." (emphasis in original)); 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrIcE, supra note 13,
23.06-2, at 23-325 ("[AII meanings attributable to [typicality] duplicate require-
ments prescribed by other provisions in Rule 23."). See generally Comment, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) Typicality Requirement: The Superfluous Prerequisite to
Maintaining a Class Action, 42 OHIo ST. LJ. 797 (1981).
90. Class heterogeneity can place an extra burden on both the named defend-
ant and the court. The representative defendant, who usually will not have cho-
sen his role, must coordinate the interests and defenses of the class. When class
heterogeneity is great, the representative bears the burden of ensuring that a mul-
tiplicity of interests are advocated. This increased burden could compromise ade-
quate representation by the named defendant, a result that could violate
fundamental notions of due process. See HARVARD Note, supra note 21, at 647-50.
In addition, certification of a heterogeneous class can impose a significant burden
on the court. See Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 527 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 1975) ("As the
size and scope of plaintiff class versus defendant class lawsuits expend, [sic] there
302
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interests of unnamed class members.9'
Courts generally have taken two approaches when ap-
plying the typicality requirement stated in Rule 23(a)(3).
Some courts have held that no conflicts of interest may exist
among members of the class. 92 In certain circumstances,
this interpretation would be useful to prevent the certifica-
tion of a class that included competitors who would advocate
different defenses in order to obtain the best remedy for
themselves. A second, and more useful, approach has been
to interpret typicality to mean that the representative's
claims or defenses must be grounded in the same legal the-
ory as that of the class. 93 Framed in these terms, the typical-
ity requirement helps prevent class heterogeneity, because
the class representative's defenses must coincide with class
defenses .94
Additionally, some courts have expanded the notion of
typicality by requiring that defendant class members be
joined by a preexisting relationship when the class is certi-
fied. 95 In La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 96 the Ninth
increasingly must be concern that the federal courts may become employed in
ways inappropriate to the nature of the judicial process."). Although a single in-
junction might be sufficient, the administration of relief might be too taxing on a
court if individual remedies were required after a finding of class liability. See
Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 236 (9th Cir. 1974) (denying certi-
fication of defendant class of 2000 members in which trial would "repeat itself
with individual differences some 2,000 times"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
91. See Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 529 (N.D. Ind. 1975) ("Particularly in
the case of a defendant class representative, the court must be concerned with the
possible effects of non-typical claims or defenses on the litigation posture of the
representative and consequent effects upon the defense of the interests of the
other class members.").
92. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 24
(2d Cir. 1971) (conflicts among inmates preclude adequate plaintiff class repre-
sentation); cf. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.
Supp. 279, 293 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (absence of conflicts among defendant school offi-
cials fosters typicality and adequacy of representation).
93. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 71 n.7 (5th Cir. 1973) (named plaintiff
typical of class because claims for relief based on same legal or remedial theory).
94. But see COLUMBIA Note, supra note 21, at 1390 (typicality does little to limit
class heterogeneity).
95. See La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir.
1973) (denying defendant class certification); Coleman v. McLaren, 98 F.R.D.
638, 648 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (same); Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1237-38
(N.D. Ind. 1976) (certifying defendant class of over 1000 township trustees);
Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 527-28 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (denying defendant class
certification). See generally Note, Juridical Links, supra note 21.
96. 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Circuit treated the typicality requirement as a significant re-
straint on class definition. In La Mar, the named plaintiff
brought suit on behalf of a class of pawnbrokers' customers
against a defendant class of all licensed pawnbrokers in Ore-
gon to recover damages for alleged violations of the Truth
in Lending Act.97 Because the named plaintiff had dealt with
only one of the defendants and because the named plaintiff's
claims were not "typical" of claims that might be asserted
against unnamed defendants, the court denied certification
of both classes. 98
In dicta, however, the La Mar court suggested two ex-
ceptions in which plaintiff typicality might have been satis-
fied: (1) if the defendants were related as a result of a
conspiracy or a concerted scheme, 99 or (2) if the defendants
were "juridically related in a manner that suggest[ed] a sin-
gle resolution of the dispute would be expeditious."'' 00 The
second exception-commonly known as the "juridical link"
exception-tests whether individual class members are
joined by a legal enactment or agreement that authorizes
specific conduct, which then may be challenged as discrimi-
natory or unconstitutional. 01
The La Afar court's holding limited plaintiff class typi-
cality, but the La Mar court and other courts have used the
juridical link exception to define the proper scope of a de-
fendant class.' 02 Indeed, the La Mar court specifically cited
defendant classes composed of public officials as examples
of juridically related groups. 0 3
97. id. at 462.
98. Id. at 465.
99. Id. at 466. For applications of the La Mar "conspiracy or concerted
scheme" exception, see Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n, 97
F.R.D. 668 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
100. 489 F.2d at 466.
101. See generally Note, Juridical Links, supra note 21.
102. See, e.g., Coleman v. McLaren 98 F.R.D. 638, 648 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (denying
defendant class certification); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75
F.R.D. 682, 690 (D.D.C. 1977) (certifying defendant class of employers); Hopson
v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1237-38 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (certifying defendant
class of township trustees); Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 527-28 (N.D. Ind.
1975) (denying defendant class certification).
103. 489 F.2d at 469-70. However, the La Mar court did not articulate the
range ofjuridically related groups outside the public official context. If one gives
"juridical" its usual meaning, namely referring to the administration of justice,
then a juridically linked class may refer only to a class of public officials charged
with enforcing a statute. But if "juridical" is defined more broadly to include
304 [Vol. 33:283
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Applied to defendant classes, the juridical link test es-
tablishes a higher standard of typicality: Group interests
should be more homogeneous because a juridical relation-
ship-such as the one between a set of public officials
charged with enforcing a statute-guarantees similar de-
fenses.10 4 Although not a specifically delineated require-
ment of Rule 23, the juridical link test serves the useful
purpose of defining the scope of a defendant class and en-
suring typical defenses by the named representative.10 5
other legal relationships such as one connecting parties to a trade or collective
bargaining agreement, then a defendant class could be composed of a set of em-
ployers or businesses. See United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D.
682, 689-90 (D.D.C. 1977) (commodity freight agreement analogized to statute
juridically linking defendant class members).
104. See COLUMBIA Note, supra note 21, at 1394-1401 (advocating juridical link
test to limit scope of defendant class and prevent burdens associated with class
heterogeneity).
105. The juridical link test also has been used by courts to fulfill the constitu-
tional requirement of standing, which mandates that interested parties have a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of a legal controversy in order for their claims to be
adjudicated. See, e.g., Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1237-38 (N.D. Ind.
1976); cf Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 527-28 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (absence of
juridical link precludes class certification for lack of standing). See generally Note,
Juridical Links, supra note 21.
Bilateral class actions can present standing problems because the named
plaintiff usually will have a justiciable claim against the named defendant but not
against other defendant class members who have not injured him personally. In
Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the court
encountered a bilateral class action involving a defendant class of 19 state and
national banks alleged to have violated a statute governing the calculation of in-
terest rates on loans, and a plaintiff class of all borrowers from the banks. Deter-
mining that the named plaintiff lacked standing because he had dealt with only
one of the banks, the Weiner court stated that a "plaintiff may not use the proce-
dural device of a class action to boot strap himself into standing he lacks under
the express terms of the substantive law." Id. at 694. The court then provided a
two-step approach for bilateral class certification: the plaintiff first must establish
his personal standing to sue each defendant, and then he must meet the Rule 23
requirements to act as a class representative. Id.
The Weiner ruling, although dealing directly with the issue of standing in bi-
lateral class actions, rarely has been followed in civil rights defendant class litiga-
tion. Most courts that have addressed the standing question have used the La Mar
juridical link exception to bypass any standing problems in litigation containing a
defendant class of public officials or private employers. See, e.g., Mudd v. Busse,
68 F.R.D. 522, 527-28 (N.D. Ind. 1975) ("where all members of the defendant
class were connected by a common 'juridical link,' a plaintiff class versus a defend-
ant class suit could be appropriate, even though no named plaintiff would have
personal claims against most members of the defendant class").
Although the juridical link test may allow courts to sidestep the standing
question, the test is better limited to defining the scope of the class rather than
evading standing questions. A more direct approach would view standing on the
basis of the class as a whole rather than on the standing of the individual class
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B. Rule 23(b)
In addition to meeting the four requirements of Rule
23(a), a defendant class must meet the requirements of one
of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Subdivision (b)(1)
applies when the risk of inconsistent judgments would com-
promise the rights of the parties.' 0 6 Subdivision (b)(2)
applies when equitable relief relative to the class is appropri-
ate.1 0 7 Subdivision (b)(3), Rule 23's "catch-all" provision,
applies when common questions of law or fact predominate
over individual questions and a class action is the most ap-
propriate form of litigation. 0 Rule 23(b)(2) has become
the major source of conflict in the certification of civil rights
defendant classes, and close examination of the different
readings of subdivision (b)(2) is essential to understand judi-
cial interpretation of the rule. However, before considering
Rule 23(b)(2), it is helpful to examine the two other subdivi-
sions of Rule 23(b) in order to understand the alternatives to
(b) (2) certification.
1. Inapplicability of Rule 23(b)(3)
Rule 23(b)(3) establishes the least stringent require-
ments for certification under Rule 23(b). Class members
need be linked only by the predominance of common legal
or factual questions. Defendant class certification is clearly
authorized by Rule 23(b)(3): The subdivision states that the
court may inquire into "the interest of members of the class
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of sepa-
rate actions" and the "extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class."' 0 9
Nonetheless, when applied to defendant classes, Rule
23(b)(3) has limited value because absent members may ex-
members. Class standing would imply that the plaintiff and defendant classes be
considered separate entities rather than collections of individuals. Injuries suf-
fered by the plaintiff class at the hands of the defendant class would replace indi-
vidual injuries suffered by individual class members. See generally Bledsoe, Moolness
and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 430 (1973); Kane, Standing, Moot-
ness, and Federal Rule 23-Balancing Perspectives, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 83 (1976);
Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1637 (1981).
106. FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(b)(1).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
108. FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(b)(3).
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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clude themselves from the class. °10 Although they may re-
main in the class if they have a sufficient stake in the
outcome of the litigation, absent defendant class members
may easily "opt out" of the class to escape liability.II If the
broad enforcement of substantive rights is a primary goal of
defendant class litigation, the self-exclusion of defendant
class members is untenable. Therefore, from a practical
standpoint, subdivision (b)(3) has little potential as a vehicle
for defendant class certification."l 2
2. Rule 23(b)(1): Protecting the Interests of the Parties
Because courts usually have invoked Rule 23(b)(2) to
certify defendant classes, Rule 23(b)(1) largely has been ig-
nored as a method for certifying civil rights defendant class
actions. Nevertheless, the (b)(1) category provides a viable
conduit for certifying defendant classes. Rule 23(b)(1) is
designed to protect the parties' rights against inconsistent
adjudications." 3 The subdivision is split into two clauses:
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); see supra note 82.
111. See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Duniway, J., concurring), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975):
What member of a class of defendants who is in his right mind, and
who is told that, if he does not elect to be excluded, he may be liable
... .will fail to opt out? It seems more than probable that the
court, having gone to the trouble and expense of learning the name
and address of each potential .. . defendant and of devising a
proper notice and having sent it out, will wind up with no "class" of
defendants, but only those who are named as defendants and are
served with process in the ordinary way.
See also United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 693 (D.D.C.
1977); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 17 (N.D. Ohio 1972). But see 1 H. NEWBERG,
supra note 21, § 4.60 (discussing suitability of Rule 23(b)(3) for defendant class
actions).
112. Nevertheless, defendant class actions have been certified under Rule
23(b)(3). See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Fox & Co., 102 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (securities litigation containing defendant class of partners in accounting
firm); Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (antitrust suit containing defendant class of trade association members);
National Constructors Ass'n v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 498 F. Supp. 510
(D. Md. 1980) (same), modified, 678 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed, 463
U.S. 1234 (1983); In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(securities litigation containing defendant class of underwriters); Research Corp.
v. Pfister Associated Growers, 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (defendant class
of patent infringers); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc.,
285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (same).
113. "The difficulties which would be likely to arise if resort were had to sepa-
rate actions by or against the individual members of the class here furnish the
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(b)(1)(A) protects the party opposing the class,' 14 and
(b)(1)(B) protects members of the class themselves.15 The
clauses are not mutually exclusive, however, and class ac-
tions may be certified under (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or both.116
a. Clause (b)(1)(A). Rule 23(b)(1)(A) applies when sep-
arate actions against members of the defendant class would
create a risk of "inconsistent or varying adjudications with
respect to individual members of the [defendant] class which
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class [i.e., the plaintiff]."' 17  Under
clause (b)(1)(A), a class action must fulfill two requirements.
First, a concrete risk of future adjudications must exist,
otherwise differing standards could not be formulated by the
courts. 1 8 Second, as a result of the prospect of multiple
adjudications, the plaintiff must face potentially "incompati-
ble standards of conduct" relative to defendant class
members. 1'9
Defendant classes certified under Rule 23(b) (1) (A) have
arisen primarily in two settings:120 patent infringement liti-
gation' 2' and securities litigation.122 Illustrative is In re Itel
Securities Litigation, 123 in which the court certified a defendant
class of underwriters who were alleged to have violated the
Securities Act of 1933 by making debenture offerings based
reasons for, and the principal key to, the propriety and value of utilizing the class-
action device." Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 100.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(A).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(B).
116. Seegenerally 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13, 23.31[2]; 7A
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1772.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
118. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1773, at 8-9.
119. See id.; A. MILLER, supra note 73, at 44 (Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is designed to
protect against "situations in which the non-class party does not know, because of
inconsistent results, whether or not it can pursue a particular course of
conduct.").
120. Defendant classes certified under subdivision (b)(1)(A) have appeared
only rarely in civil rights litigation. See Smith v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners, 28 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 731, 733 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Danforth v.
Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287, 288-89 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
121. See, e.g., Dale Elecs., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elecs., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 537 (D.N.H.
1971); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp.
714, 721-23 (N.D. Il. 1968).
122. See, e.g., Weinberger v.Jackson, 102 F.R.D. 839, 848-49 (N.D. Cal. 1984);
McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 96 F.R.D. 357, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1982); In re Itel Sec.
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 126 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
123. 89 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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on false and misleading registration statements and p, ospec-
tuses. 12 4 In determining the propriety of (b)(1)(A) certifica-
tion, the court considered whether the plaintiffs would be
faced with different determinations of whether the registra-
tion statements and prospectuses published by individual
defendant class members were true. 125 The court stated that
because the "same plaintiff would be suffering inconsistent
adjudications on the same issue,"1 26 certification of a de-
fendant class under clause (b)(1)(A) was proper. Determin-
ing the validity of the statements' 'truth through a class
action would prevent the possibility of inconsistent future
adjudications setting inconsistent standards for the plain-
tiffs.12 7 Thus, a class action prevented the plaintiffs from
facing inconsistent standards of conduct relative to the de-
fendant class-what one commentator has called a "con-
flicted position." 28
In the civil rights context, a defendant class action can
be certified under Rule 23(b) (1) (A) if future inconsistent liti-
gation might place the opposing party, namely the plaintiff
class, in a conflicted position relative to the defendant class.
If members of a plaintiff class could obtain complete relief
only by suing numerous individual defendants in separate
124. Id. at 109-27. The court certified two defendant classes of underwriters:
one class, certified under Rule 23(b)(3), allegedly made debenture offerings based
on registration statements containing misrepresentations or omissions, id. at
109-14; the other class, certified under Rule 23(b)(l)(A), was accused of having
made debenture offerings based on prospectuses with untrue statements, id. at
114-27.
125. Id. at 123-25.
126. Id. at 125.
127. But cf. In re Victor Technologies Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 53, 63-65 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (defendant class of underwriters certified under (b)(3) rather than
(b)(l)(A) because requirement of incompatible standards of conduct from incon-
sistent adjudications would not be met).
128. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 388 (1967):
[C]onsider, in relation to varying states of fact, the difficulties that
could arise if litigations were carried on, one by one, with individual
members of the class. If such repetitious litigations might confront
the party opposing the class with adjudications establishing for him
inconsistent or incompatible standards of action, then a class action
with a single adjudication is evidently in order. . . . [Clause
(b)(l)(A)] takes in cases where the party is obliged by law to treat the
members of the class alike . . . , or where the party must treat all
alike as a matter of practical necessity . . . .The party is saved by a
class action from being forced into a "conflicted" position.
1985] 309
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actions, and the different suits resulted in different injunc-
tions or the absence of liability for some defendants, then
the plaintiff class members would be placed in a conflicted
position.1 29 For example, in multiple suits against a collec-
tion of public officials, separate plaintiffs could be forced to
modify their conduct because a statute enforced by different
defendants would be applied inconsistently against the
plaintiff class. Conductjudged permissible in one suit might
be judged impermissible in another suit.' 30 Similarly, in an
employment discrimination suit, plaintiff class members
could be forced to modify their employment status to com-
ply with different hiring or promotion practices among em-
ployers who had different policies arising from separate
adjudications.' 3 '
b. Clause (b)(1)(B). Under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), a defend-
ant class may be certified if separate actions would create a
risk of "adjudications with respect to individual members of
the [defendant] class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other [defendant class]
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially im-
pair or impede their ability to protect their interests."'' 32
Clause (b)(1)(B), unlike clause (b)(1)(A), does not require a
concrete risk of future litigation because a single adjudica-
tion "as a practical matter" would affect the rights of other
129. If the plaintiff class as a whole is considered a party, then the interests of
the plaintiff class could suffice to place the party opposing the defendant class,
namely the plaintiff class, into a conflicted position relative to individual defend-
ants. However, if the term "party opposing the class" must refer to an individual
rather than a class, then defendant class certification under clause (b)(1)(A) may
be unavailable in a bilateral class action. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule
23 appears to indicate that the party opposing the class may refer only to an indi-
vidual: "One person may have rights against, or be under duties toward, numer-
ous persons constituting a class, and be so positioned that conflicting or varying
adjudications in lawsuits with individual members of the class might establish in-
compatible standards to govern his conduct." Advisory Committee Note, supra
note 13, at 100. Nevertheless, the Note presents examples of possible litigation
and does not necessarily limit the potential classes maintainable under clause
(b)(l)(A). In any case, the Note further states, "Actions by or against a class pro-
vide a ready and fair means of achieving unitary adjudication." Id. Since a goal of
a defendant class action is unitary adjudication in order to enforce substantive
policies, a plaintiff class should be considered a party for the purposes of the rule.
130. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
131. See Smith v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 28 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 731, 733 (N.D. Ohio 1978); infra notes 153-55 and accompanying
text.
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(B).
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potential class members. 3 3 Instead, the clause focuses on
the impairment of class members' interests in relation to a
common property or fund. 3 4
In cases involving semiautonomous public officials act-
ing under a challenged statute, a (b)(1)(B) defendant class
action has been held to be appropriate because the interests
of each official in relation to the questioned statute were
identical. 3 5 For example, in Pennsylvania Association for Re-
tarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 136 the court certified a defend-
ant class composed of state school -districts charged with
enforcing a statute that excluded retarded children from a
public school education.' 3 7 Because the conflict revolved
around the constitutionality of the statute, all the officials
had a stake in the outcome of the suit. The common interest
in the legality of a statute linked the officials and provided
the basis for (b)(1)(B) certification. A declaration of the stat-
ute's legality would be dispositive of the interests of the de-
fendant class members.' 38 Certification of civil rights
defendant classes under clause (b)(1)(B) has been limited,
however, primarily because most courts have certified de-
fendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2).
3. Disparate Readings of Rule 23(b)(2)
Rule 23(b)(2) has become the focal point for certifying
civil rights defendant class actions. The courts, however, are
divided over the proper interpretion of subdivision (b)(2).
Most courts have certified defendant classes under Rule
23(b) (2) as a matter of course. 3 9 Since a civil rights bilateral
class action matches a plaintiff class against a defendant
class, courts have certified defendant classes as simple ad-
133. See generally 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13, 23.35[2]; 7A
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1774.
134. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 100-02.
135. See, e.g., Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Conn. 1984) (defendant
class of superior court judges); Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Miss.
1975) (defendant class composed of mayors, aldermen, and election commission-
ers); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (defendant class composed of school districts and state board of
education). But see Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 530 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (rejecting
certification under (b)(l)(B) of defendant class of judges).
136. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
137. Id. at 291-92.
138. See VALPARAISO Note, supra note 21, at 402-06.
139. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
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juncts of the plaintiff classes. Other courts have interpreted
Rule 23(b)(2) more carefully, but they have applied the
terms of the rule mechanically and often have failed to ex-
amine both the relationship between the parties and the na-
ture of the defendant class itself.140 In contrast, a few courts
have denied certification as a doctrinal matter, holding Rule
23(b)(2) completely inappropriate for certifying defendant
classes. 4'
The conflicts among the courts may be traced directly to
the language of Rule 23(b)(2), which states that a class ac-
tion may be maintained when "the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive re-
lief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole."' 42 Applied to a plaintiff class, the lan-
guage of the rule is clear: When a defendant has acted in a
certain way toward the class, injunctive relief to curtail the
defendant's conduct becomes appropriate. But applied to a
defendant class, Rule 23(b)(2)'s language is awkward and
ambiguous: The party opposing the class becomes the
plaintiff (or plaintiff class), and the actions of the plaintiff
would appear to necessitate equitable relief against the
plaintiff. 143
Thus, the debate revolves around the proper interpreta-
tion of the language of subdivision (b)(2) and the relation-
ship of the parties in a defendant class suit. Because of the
rule's ambiguity regarding defendant class certification, the
courts have developed discordant interpretations of the
rule's requirements. Three basic theories have emerged: an
instrumental certification theory, a plaintiff-based certifica-
tion theory, and a literal interpretation (noncertification)
theory.
a. Instrumental Certification. Courts employing the most
common approach to defendant class certification view Rule
23(b)(2) solely as an expedient for enforcing substantive
140. See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
143. Applied to a defendant class, Rule 23(b)(2) reads as follows: "[The plain-
tiff (class)] has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the [de-
fendant] class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the [defendant] class as a whole."
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law. Regardless of whether plaintiff class certification or de-
fendant class certification is sought, Rule 23(b)(2) is the ap-
propriate provision. The linchpin of this instrumental
approach predicates the certification of a (b)(2) defendant
class on the need for injunctive relief, 44 not on the actions
of either party or on the relationship between the parties.
This approach has become commonplace in bilateral class
actions in which plaintiff and defendant classes are certified
in a single judicial stroke.145 Because the courts focus more
on the nature of the relief sought, .the language of Rule
23(b)(2) regarding the actions of the parties largely is
ignored. 146
For example, in the leading case of United States v. Truck-
ing Employers, Inc., 147 the court certified a defendant class of
employers and unions who were subject to a national collec-
tive bargaining agreement that allegedly fostered racially
discriminatory employment practices. 48 The court stated:
[S]ection (b)(2) is designed simply to facilitate class ac-
tions in which injunctive relief plays a central role.
Whether the injunction would bind all members of a de-
fendant class or benefit all members of a plaintiff class, or
both, should be of no consequence so long as the com-
plaint raises issues common to the class. 149
The court went on to state: "[T]he suit is, in effect, both a
plaintiff and a defendant class action. With respect to the
language of Rule 23(b)(2), the suit then appears to be one in
which each side has acted on grounds generally applicable to
the other."'' 5 0
144. Injunctive relief also is available under other provisions of Rule 23(b). See
Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 100 (multiple suits for injunctive re-
lief may trigger the need for class certification under subdivision (b)(1)).
145. See, e.g., Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979); Harris v. Graddick, 593
F. Supp. 128 (M.D. Ala. 1984); Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682 (D.D.C. 1977); Hopson
v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
146. See Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("[A]ithough Rule
23(b)(2) is, on its face, inapplicable to defendant classes, the courts are simply
unwilling to deprive the plaintiff of this useful measure.").
147. 75 F.R.D. 682 (D.D.C. 1977).
148. See supra note 45.
149. 75 F.R.D. at 692.
150. Id. at 693 (emphasis in original). The Second Circuit adopted this ap-
proach in Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979). Approving certification of a de-
fendant class of sheriffs, the Marcera court stated, "Since declaratory and injunc-
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Nevertheless, although an instrumental approach fos-
ters the substantive policies behind a civil rights suit, it
grants only lip service to the rule. The provisions of Rule
23(b)(2) are specific; they require both action by the party
opposing the class and the need for injunctive relief.
Clearly, a court that relies solely on the injunctive nature of
a class action suit to justify certification is misreading Rule
23. Even if the litigation revolves around civil rights en-
forcement, the requirements of the rule cannot be ignored
so readily.
b. Plaintiff-Based Certification. Another line of reasoning
among courts that have certified defendant classes under
subdivision (b)(2) predicates the appropriateness of class-
wide injunctive relief on actions by the named plaintiff or the
plaintiff class as a whole. Rule 23(b)(2) states that the party
opposing the class must have acted or refused to act in rela-
tion to the class; therefore, the language of the rule requires
focusing on the plaintiffs actions if certification of a defend-
ant class is to be possible at all. Accordingly, the courts have
developed a number of plaintiff-based approaches to certify
(b)(2) defendant classes.
Courts employing one plaintiff-based approach argue
that the named plaintiff's initiation of the lawsuit qualifies as
an action against the defendant class. 15' This approach,
while ostensibly adhering to the language of subdivision
(b)(2), makes a travesty of the rule. If simply filing a claim
against a defendant class suffices to fulfill all the require-
ments of subdivision (b)(2), then the subdivision is gratui-
tous. Defendant class actions would be certified
automatically once the Rule 23(a) requirements are satisfied.
Courts employing another plaintiff-based approach to
defendant class certification view deterministically a plain-
tiff's acts or omissions. 52 For example, if a defendant has
discriminated by refusing to hire a plaintiff, then the plaintiff
tive relief is sought against identical behavior, we conclude that this case is a
proper (b)(2) defendant class action." Id. at 1238 n.10.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 692
(D.D.C. 1977) ("[Pllaintiff 'has acted ... on grounds generally applicable to the
[defendant] class' merely by bringing the action."); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp.
301, 304 (E.D. Wis. 1975) ("[T]he plaintiff class in challenging the constitutional-
ity of [the state statute] acts on grounds generally applicable to the defendant
class.").
152. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 n.l (N.D. Tex. 1982) (plaintiff
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is forced to act differently-she must look for a job else-
where. Adopting this line of reasoning, the court in Penn-
sylvania v. Local 542, International Union of Operating
Engineers153 certified a defendant class composed of the
union and a set of employers and trade associations; the
court concluded that when "a class of plaintiffs is forced, if
they wish to be employed . . . , to act with respect to the
defendant class of employers in one and only one way, the
requirements of 23(b)(2) are met."' 54 The court's approach
adheres to subdivision (b)(2)'s requirement that the oppos-
ing party must have acted relative to the class, but a weak-
ness in this reasoning is that in many civil rights cases, an act
or an omission is not important. Rather, a person's individ-
ual characteristics, namely those features that determine her
status as a member of a protected group, are essential. i 55
Yet even if a court finds that the plaintiffs have "acted"
in relation to the defendant class, this approach fails to rec-
ognize the causal connection between the requirements of
subdivision (b)(2). 156 It is because the opposing party has
acted in a certain way toward class members that injunctive
relief to end the action is appropriate. A (b)(2) plaintiff class
is defined by the illegal actions of the party opposing the
class, namely the defendant. But a (b)(2) defendant class
cannot be defined by the illegal actions of a plaintiff. In a
defendant class suit, acts or omissions by the plaintiff class,
while fulfilling the "action" requirement of subdivision
(b)(2), lack the nexus to fulfill the "appropriate relief" re-
quirement, because injunctive relief against the plaintiffs' ac-
tions would be misguided. 5 7
c. Literal Interpretations. Those courts that have denied
defendant class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) have ar-
forced to behave in certain way to avoid prosecution under antihomosexual sod-
omy statute), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
153. 469 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd mem., 648 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1981)
(en banc), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Penn-
sylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
154. Id. at 416.
155. Title VII, for example, is designed to protect individuals from discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, national origin, color, sex, or religion-characteristics
that pertain more to status and condition than action. See supra note 41.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (party opposing class has acted "on grounds gen-
erally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate" relief with respect to the
class (emphasis added)).
157. See Coleman v. McLaren, 98 F.R.D. 638, 651-52 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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gued that the literal language of the subdivision precludes
defendant class certification." 8 Both the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits have held flatly that Rule 23(b)(2) does not apply to
defendant class actions. In Paxman v. Campbell, 159 the Fourth
Circuit criticized the certification of a defendant class of
school boards under Rule 23(b)(2) and stated that "[t]o pro-
ceed under 23(b)(2) against a class of defendants would con-
stitute the plaintiffs as 'the party opposing the class,' and
would create the anomalous situation in which the plaintiffs'
own actions or inactions could make injunctive relief against
the defendants appropriate."'' 60 For the same reason, in
Thompson v. Board of Education, 161 the Sixth Circuit stated,
"[T]he language in [Rule 23(b)(2)] contemplates certifica-
tion of a plaintiff class against a single defendant, not the
certification of a defendant class."'162
Moreover, a literal interpretation of subdivision (b)(2) is
supported by the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23.
Although the Note states that civil rights litigation is an ap-
propriate basis for certifying plaintiff classes under subdivi-
sion (b)(2), 163 the Note also states that the injunctive relief in
response to the opposing party's action must "settl[e] the
legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a
whole."' 164 This reference to settling the legality of a party's
behavior can only be intended to describe the actions of a
defendant. Therefore, although the framers of Rule 23 envi-
sioned civil rights enforcement as a basis for categorizing
class actions under subdivision (b)(2), 165 the provision sim-
ply does not sanction defendant class certification.
The judicial misreading of Rule 23(b)(2) is troubling.
Courts that have certified defendant classes as plaintiff class
counterparts have ignored the requirements of Rule
23(b)(2). Courts that have interpreted the subdivision's lan-
158. See, e.g., Thompson v. Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983);
Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129
(1981); Coleman v. McLaren, 98 F.R.D. 638 (N.D. 11. 1983).
159. 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981).
160. Id. at 854.
161. 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
162. Id. at 1204.
163. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 102.
164. Id.
165. See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
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guage so that it may be "wrenched to fit"166 defendant
classes have failed to realize that such an interpretation is
misapplied in civil rights cases in which injunctive relief can
lie only against a defendant. Given the language of subdivi-
sion (b)(2), the literal interpretation appears to be the cor-
rect view regarding Rule 23(b)(2)'s applicability to
defendant class actions.
In dealing with bilateral class suits, courts have erred in
certifying defendant classes by analogizing them to plaintiff
classes. But the two devices are distinct, and Rule 23 must
be applied independently for each class. Rule 23, like the
other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is designed to facili-
tate substantive norms, but procedural requirements cannot
be ignored or twisted to foster substantive policies.
III. REINTERPRETING RULE 23: TOWARD A THEORY OF THE
DEFENDANT CLAss ACTION
Defendant class actions, when coupled with plaintiff
class actions, provide an unusual enforcement tool for vindi-
cating constitutional and statutory rights. But as a proce-
dural mechanism, the defendant class action is an anomaly.
Like the more common plaintiff class action, it can prevent
the relitigation of issues and foster the enforcement of im-
portant public laws. 167 Yet defendant class actions raise pro-
cedural and constitutional 6 problems of their own. Courts
that have recognized these problems have limited the use of
defendant class actions by imposing more stringent stan-
dards of adequate representation and typicality.' 6 9 Never-
theless, in attempting to categorize defendant classes under
Rule 23(b), most courts have erred. By viewing the defend-
ant class action as a simple mirror image of the plaintiff class
action, courts have ignored or misconstrued procedural
requirements. ' 70
The misreading of Rule 23 stems from a fundamental
166. 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13, 23.40[6), at 23-310
("[I]n the case of a defendant class action, it becomes more problematical whether
the quoted language can be wrenched to fit, since a literal reading may produce
somewhat nonsensical results on the facts .... ").
167. See supra notes 27-67 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 82-86, 105 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 74-105 and accompanying text..
170. See supra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
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problem inherent in the rule itself. The rule and the theo-
ries underlying the rule are designed for the certification of
plaintiff classes; the authorization for defendant classes is in
form only. In order to evaluate the propriety of defendant
class certification, a theory that accurately describes defend-
ant class actions must be developed.'l7 This Part analyzes
justifications for the class action under Rule 23, criticizes the
rule's incomplete treatment of defendant class actions, and
then proposes a framework for the defendant class action
based on compulsory joinder. The framework is applied to
defendant classes in civil rights litigation, and certification
under Rule 23(b)(1) is suggested as the proper method for
judicial application of the defendant class action.
A. History and Theory: Understanding the Inadequacies of
Rule 23
The current wording of Rule 23 prevents the use of the
(b)(2) and (b)(3) categories to certify defendant class ac-
tions. Subdivision (b)(3) is rendered ineffective by its "opt-
out" provision, 172 and subdivision (b)(2) accommodates
only plaintiff classes.' 73 Only subdivision (b)(1) appears to
171. Amendment would be the easiest solution to the present inadequacies of
Rule 23. Certainly, the "opt out" provision for (b)(3) classes could be revised to
prevent defendant class members from excluding themselves from the suit. Cf
UNIF. CLAss ACTiONS ACT § 8(d), 12 U.L.A. 24, 31 (Supp. 1985) (model statute
worded so that defendant class members may not opt out). Additionally, the
mandatory notice requirement for (b)(3) classes might be extended to all defend-
ant classes, regardless of the category invoked. See supra notes 82-88 and accom-
panying text.
The linguistic difficulties with Rule 23(b)(2) could be alleviated by revising
the subdivision so that consistent equitable relief would be applicable to both
plaintiff and defendant classes. A possible amendment might be the following:
"the party opposing the class or the class members themselves have acted or re-
fused to act in a manner making appropriate final injunctive or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the parties in the litigation." One should note,
however, that this rewording presumes that the intent of subdivision (b)(2) is con-
sistent equitable relief relative to the class. Rule 23 (b)(l)(A), which provides for
unitary adjudications to prevent prejudice against the party opposing the class, see
supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text, might render the above revision gra-
tuitous, since clause (b)(1)(A) may be applied to prevent inconsistent standards
arising from different injunctions.
In any case, it is unlikely that Rule 23 will be amended in the near future
simply to accommodate the proper application of defendant class actions. Given
the relative infrequency of defendant class actions, courts should conceptualize
defendant classes according to the present wording of the rule.
172. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
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support defendant class certification. 74 Thus, by looking
solely at the language of Rule 23, a ready solution to defend-
ant class certication emerges. But linguistic analysis alone is
insufficient. The history and the theories underlying the
rule must be examined in order to understand both the
rule's present wording and the propriety of defendant class
certification under subdivision (b)(1).
1. Amended Rule 23
In 1966 Rule 23 was overhauled to clarify the certifica-
tion of class actions in federal court. 175 Original Rule 23,
promulgated in 1938, authorized three categories of class
actions, 76 framed in terms ofjural relations among the class
members. 77 Rights to be enforced or opposed 78 defined
class membership, and classes were labeled "true," "hy-
brid," or "spurious. '" 1 79 Explicit in theory, the rule's catego-
ries were extraordinarily elusive in practice. 80 Courts rarely
could discern whether a class was true, hybrid, or spuri-
174. See supra notes 113-38 and accompanying text.
175. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13.
176. Original Rule 23 provided in relevant part:
Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such
of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representa-
tion of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of
the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner
of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the
class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the ac-
tion; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affect-
ing the several rights and a common relief is sought.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (superceded), 308 U.S. 689 (1939). See generally 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACrIcE, supra note 13, 23.08-23.10.
177. See Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 314 (1937).
178. Original Rule 23 did not state in clear terms how a defendant class would
be certified. Because the categories of the original rule were based on rights
shared or opposed by class members, the rule appeared to require that the rights
to be determined belong to the plaintiff rather than the defendant class members,
which would seem misdirected in determining the nature of a defendant class. See
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 246; Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 78, at 696 n.39;
Note, Suggested Revision, supra note 21, at 827 & n.42.
179. See generally Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by
the Preliminary Draft, 25 Gno. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937).
180. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 98-99.
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ous. 18 And the distinction was crucial because absent mem-
bers of spurious classes were not bound by adverse
judgments unless they chose to intervene. 8 2 Commentators
scorned the abstruse categories 83 and criticized the absence
of a binding effect on members of spurious classes.' 84
The amended rule was enacted to remedy these defects
and clarify class litigation. First, the new rule substituted a
more functional approach to class certification.' 85 The ob-
scure categories of the old rule were replaced by a two-part
inquiry designed to define the scope and representation of
the class as well as the potential categories for denominating
classes. Second, the spurious category was reshaped to have
a binding effect on all class members.' 86 Absentees can no
longer collaterally attack adverse judgments; members of
(b)(3) classes who elect to remain in the class after receiving
notice are necessarily bound by the litigation. Finally, a new
provision was added to certify civil rights class actions, which
were not clearly accommodated in the old rule. 87 The
(b)(2) category unambiguously provides for plaintiff class ac-
tions requiring injunctive relief against discriminatory or un-
constitutional practices.
Since its enactment, amended Rule 23 has been a con-
venient means for certifying plaintiff class actions designed
to enforce important public laws.' 88 Yet the revisions to the
rule contain glaring oversights regarding defendant class
certification. Subdivision (b)(3) specifically authorizes de-
fendant classes, but the category is useless for this purpose
because it allows the self-exclusion of absentees. Subdivi-
sion (b)(2) sanctions the certification of civil rights plaintiff
class actions, but it is inapplicable to defendant classes be-
cause the framers of the rule focused exclusively on the
181. See Note, Suggested Revision, supra note 21, at 823 n.24.
182. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 99.
183. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 245 ("outworn categories of rights");
Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 78, at 707 n.73 ("accursed labels").
184. See Kaplan, supra note 128, at 380-86.
185. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 99 ("The amended rule de-
scribes in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions
186. Id.
187. See id. at 102; infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
188. See generally Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Real-
ity, and the "Class Action Problem, " 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979); Developments, supra
note 30.
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rights and remedies of plaintiffs. The courts have only com-
pounded the rule's failings by insisting on certifying civil
rights defendant class actions under subdivision (b)(2).1 89
An examination of the theoretical underpinnings of
amended Rule 23 reveals that neither the (b)(2) nor the
(b)(3) category can support defendant class certification.
2. The Anomaly of Subdivision (b)(3)
When considered in terms of defendant class actions,
the (b)(3) category becomes a paradox. The subdivision
mandates notice to absentees-a requirement ideally suited
to guarantee adequate representation and due process for
defendant class members.' 90 But notice is mandated for the
wrong reason: to allow class members to exit from the liti-
gation. Clearly, the framers of amended Rule 23 did not
consider defendant classes in rewriting the rule. Instead,
they envisioned the (b)(3) class action as a large-scale per-
missive joinder device through which absentees silently con-
sented to the litigation by abstention rather than
intervention.' 9 1
Because members of (b)(3) classes do not share as
strong an interest in the litigation as members of (b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes, 192 the rule allows them the option of indepen-
189. See supra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
191. See 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13, 23.02-1, at 23-84.
Original Rule 23 posed problems because it allowed the technique of "one-way
intervention." Absentees could bypass jurisdictional requirements by intervening
on an ancillary basis without having to show an independent basis for jurisdiction.
Moreover, absentees could apply the date of commencement of the action for
purposes of the statute of limitations. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note
13, at 99.
192. "In the degree that there is cohesiveness or unity in the class and the
representation is effective, the need for notice to the class will tend toward a mini-
mum." Id. at 106.
Since the interests of (b)(2) plaintiff class members regarding specific reme-
dies (e.g., busing to cure school segregation) may vary considerably, commenta-
tors have questioned the presumed unity of interest in (b)(2) classes and have
devoted greater attention to the problems of intraclass conflict. See, e.g., Garth,
Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 492
(1982); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982); Yeazell,
Group Litigation-Part IL supra note 27, at 1108-19; see also Bell, Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470
(1976) (discussing conflicts of interest among classnembers and attorneys for the
class).
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dently pursuing litigation after receiving notice. 93 This
procedural safeguard operates on two levels to make de-
fendant class certification under subdivision (b)(3) inappro-
priate. First, the mechanism of consent-self-exclusion
following notice-eviscerates a defendant class action. De-
fendants do not consent to participate in litigation. Even if
consent involves determining who the proper class repre-
sentative should be, a defendant should not be able to es-
cape potential liability by removing himself from the suit.
94
On a second level, the opt-out mechanism reflects the
function that (b)(3) class actions serve in contemporary liti-
gation. Because members of a (b)(3) class share a loosely
defined interest, the class action fosters litigation that arises
only through a class suit. This fostering of litigation-the
class action's "enabling" function-supports the vindication
of substantive rights that otherwise would not be litigated
because litigation expenses would far exceed the potential
benefits an individual plaintiff might derive from pursuing
an individual action.' 95 The class action encourages litiga-
tion by uniting common claims against a common
opponent. 196
But the enabling function is inapposite to an analysis of
defendant classes. Although one might conceptualize a de-
fendant class action as a procedure for strengthening de-
fenses against a plaintiff class, the defendant class action
193. Professor Yeazell has criticized Rule 23's consent and notice provisions as
internally inconsistent. Yeazell, Group Litigation-Part II, supra note 27, at 1110-11.
Rule 23(b)(3) plaintiff class actions, which usually involve money damages, do not
require notice to class members because the economic incentive is sufficient to
allow nonconsensual representation. Conversely, civil rights class actions certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(2) ought to require notice because of differing interests
regarding the proper remedy to be administered. Id.
194. Even consent based on active intervention is problematic. Intervention
may be desirable, see supra note 78, but a defendant may be reluctant to intervene
if he can escape liability by not participating at all.
195. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 78.
196. The utility of the class action in opening up the courts to small claimants
has generated the greatest controversy over Rule 23. Compare Pomerantz, New
Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAw.
1259, 1259 (1970) (calling class action "one of the most socially useful remedies
in history") with Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-
trust Suits-The Twenty- Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971)
(describing class action as "legalized blackmail"). Rather than focus on the class
action procedure alone, Professor Miller prefers to view the growth of the class
action in conjunction with concomitant developments in the expansion of public
law. See Miller, supra note 188, at 669-76.
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plays a different role in civil litigation. Rather than aggre-
gate claims to increase the bargaining power of class mem-
bers, 97 the defendant class action consolidates cases in
order to prevent inconsistencies that might arise from multi-
ple litigation. Instead of causing new litigation, a defendant
class action pulls together existing litigants.
3. Civil Rights and Rule 23(b)(2)
Unlike subdivision (b)(3), subdivision (b)(2) does not
permit the self-exclusion of class members. Nonetheless,
Rule 23(b)(2) is equally inappropriate for certifying defend-
ant classes. Because the authors of the rule focused on ac-
commodating plaintiff classes to promote group relief and
remedy group injury, the subdivision does not sanction de-
fendant class certification.
The (b)(2) class action was an innovation in amended
Rule 23. The original rule contained no specific reference
to injunctive or declaratory relief as a basis for certifying
classes.19 8 Although subdivision (b)(2) was promulgated as
a generic rule, 199 the, history surrounding the rule indicates
that it was designed primarily to guarantee that civil rights
suits could be maintained as class actions. 200
Before 1966, the propriety of civil rights class actions
was uncertain. A few courts had held that civil rights claims
were discrete and could not be asserted by a class.20' In Car-
197. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) ("Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for class actions that may enhance the
efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine their limited resources
to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.").
198. The only reference to relief in the original rule was "common relief"
under the spurious category. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (superceded), 83 U.S. 689
(1939); see supra note 176.
199. In addition to civil rights violations, the Advisory Committee Note offers
price discrimination by a wholesaler and tying violations by a patentee as potential
bases for (b)(2) certification. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 102.
200. See id.; 7A C. WRIGr & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1775, at 24-25; Cohn,
The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1216 (1966). Prior to the
promulgation of the amended rule, one commentator even suggested that the
(b)(2) category be revised to accommodate only civil rights class actions. Note,
Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629, 647-50 (1965). The
commentator proposed that "acted or refused to act on grounds generally appli-
cable to the class" be replaced with "discriminated against the class," and that
adverse judgments not be binding on losing absentees. Id. at 649-50.
201. See, e.g., Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d.930 (5th Cir. 1958); Carson v. Warlick,
238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Williams v. Kansas
City, 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
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son v. Warlick,20 2 for example, the Fourth Circuit held that
the nondiscriminatory admission of black children to public
schools was an individual rather than a class right.20 3 De-
spite apparent group injury, individual plaintiffs had to as-
sert individual constitutional violations. The majority of
courts, however, rejected this reasoning and supported the
use of class actions in federal civil rights litigation.20 4 For
example, in Potts v. Flax,20 5 the court stated: "[A] school seg-
regation suit presents more than a claim of invidious dis-
crimination to individuals by reason of a universal policy of
segregation. It involves a discrimination against a class as a
class, and this is assuredly appropriate for class relief."20 6
Codifying the majority view, Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes
civil rights class actions in clarion terms. The need for class-
wide injunctive relief to end a defendant's discriminatory
acts makes a plaintiff class action not only desirable but es-
sential. But this same commitment to guaranteeing civil
rights class actions has prompted the widespread judicial
misreading of the rule's applicability to defendant classes.
Because civil rights suits contain natural candidates for
(b)(2) plaintiff class certification, courts have predicated de-
fendant class certification on the substantive law of the litiga-
tion and the nature of the relief sought by the plaintiff class.
In a civil rights suit, the existence of two opposing classes
has led courts to equate defendant class certification with
plaintiff class certification. Yet neither the language nor the
history of the rule indicates that any provision was made for
the certification of defendant classes. The error is more mis-
understanding than misinterpretation. Put simply, the
346 U.S. 826 (1953); Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Ala. 1945), revd on
other grounds, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 733 (1946).
202. 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
203. The court stated:
There is no question as to the right of these school children to
be admitted to the schools of North Carolina without discrimination
on the ground of race. They are admitted, however, as individuals,
not as a class or group; and it is as individuals that their rights under
the Constitution are asserted.
Id. at 729.
204. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 102 (citing eight civil
rights class actions prior to amendment). See generally Comment, The Class Action
Device in Antisegregation Cases, 20 U. CI. L. REV. 577 (1953).
205. 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963).
206. id. at 289 n.5 (emphasis in original).
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courts have fallen into the trap of using a single rule-with a
single definition-to breathe life into two distinctly different
procedural devices.
B. Developing a Defendant Class Action Theory
Through a process of elimination, Rule 23(b)(1) be-
comes the only viable category for certifying a defendant
class. This solution is too facile, however, because one can-
not assume that the framers of the rule gave special consid-
eration to certifying defendant clas'ses under subdivision
(b)(1).20 7 Nevertheless, the (b)(1) category does authorize
defendant class actions. The subdivision's utility lies not in
its being the only remaining category, but in its maintaining
the proper justification for a defendant class action: to join
in a single suit all those parties who should be bound by the
litigation so that complete relief may be administered.
1. Joinder, Class Action, and the Necessary
Parties Doctrine
The language of Rule 23(b)(1) parallels the language of
Rule 19, the compulsory joinder provision of the federal
rules.208 "[T]he resemblances are not accidental but logi-
cal." 20 9 Both Rule 19 and Rule 23(b)(1) provide functional
tests to facilitate the traditional justification for both joinder
and class suits-the inclusion of "necessary parties."2 1 0
At common law the necessary parties doctrine man-
207. Indeed, all the specific examples listed in the Advisory Committee Note
involve plaintiff classes. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 100-02.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) provides in part:
Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a
party in the action if. . . he claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or other-
wise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
See supra note 70 (language of Rule 23(b)(1)); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (lan-
guage of rule for intervention of right parallels language of Rule 19 and Rule
23(b)(1)).
209. Kaplan, supra note 128, at 389.
210. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 13, at 100; cf. 3B MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13, 23.08 (discussing relationship between original
Rule 19 and original Rule 23).
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dated the inclusion of parties who were essential to the com-
plete adjudication of a case.21' When presented with a
multifaceted controversy, a court could require that all indi-
viduals with an interest in the controversy be made parties.
The goals of the doctrine were:
from the viewpoint of the court, to do a complete job on
the controversy in one sitting; from the viewpoint of
those already parties, to protect them against the conse-
quences of subsequent litigation reaching inconsistent
results; from the viewpoint of those not made parties but
by the rule required to be brought in, to assure that their
practical out-of-court situation would not be adversely af-
fected by changes in the status quo wrought in conse-
quence of the judgment.212
Rule 19, framed like Rule 23 in functional terms, 21
3
211. As stated by one early commentator:
It is the constant aim of a court of equity to do complete justice by
deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested in the
subject of the suit, to make the performance of the order of the court
perfectly safe to those who are compelled to obey it, and to prevent
future litigation. For this purpose all persons materially interested
in the subject ought generally to be parties to the suit, plaintiffs or
defendants, however numerous they may be.
J. MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY,
BY ENGLISH BILL 163-64 (G. Jeremy 4th ed. 1827) (1st ed. London 1780).
212. D. LouISELL, G. HAZARD & C. TAIT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING
AND PROCEDURE 671-72 (5th ed. 1983).
213. Rule 19 was amended in 1966 partly to overcome the cloudy distinction
between necessary parties and indispensable parties. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 19 advi-
sory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 90-91 (1966). This distinction was
articulated in Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854), in which the
Supreme Court stated:
2. Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to
be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which
requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire contro-
versy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in
it. These persons are commonly termed necessary parties; but if
their interests are separable from those of the parties before the
court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete
and final justice, without affecting other persons not before the
court, the latter are not indispensable parties. 3. Persons who not
only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a
nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting
that interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its
final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience.
Curiously, courts often dismissed cases because parties were "indispensable"
rather than only "necessary." If the court could not obtain jurisdiction over an
indispensable party, the litigation could not go forward despite that party's impor-
tant stake in the suit. Although the labels seemed clear enough, courts often mis-
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maintains the traditional justifications for the mandatory
joining of parties. Joinder is required if incomplete relief
would be administered to the current parties, 21 4 or if an indi-
vidual's absence would impair her own interest or leave a
party with a risk of inconsistent obligations.2 15 Necessary
parties-whether plaintiffs or defendants-should be in-
cluded in the litigation.
The parallel between Rule 19 and Rule 23(b)(1) is cru-
cial, for as one commentator has stated, "[Subdivision
(b)(1)] provides for a mass-production solution to necessary-
parties problems."21 6 Because the total number of defend-
ants is too unwieldy for individual process, a representative
suit-a defendant class action-may be the only avenue to
complete and consistent adjudication.2 17 When the proce-
dure is viewed as an extended compulsory joinder device
rather than as a bastardized plaintiff class action, the appro-
priateness of the defendant class action becomes clear. If a
class action is not invoked to include necessary party defend-
ants, complete justice cannot be administered.2 18 Plaintiff
class members will obtain incomplete relief because some
defendants will be bound by the litigation while others will
be free to carry on an illegal policy.
The requirements of Rule 23(b)(1) provide the correct
understood the distinction and dismissed cases arbitrarily. See generally Hazard,
Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
1254 (1961); Reed, CompulsotyJoinder of Parties in Civil Actions (pts. 1 & 2), 55 MICH.
L. REV. 327, 483 (1957).
Rule 19, like Rule 23, was amended in 1966 to eschew a reliance on categori-
cal labels and to depend more on functional tests to determine the need for mul-
tiparty litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee note, supra, at 93.
214. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).
215. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2).
216. Yeazell, Group Litigation-Part I, supra note 27, at 1110.
217. Common law joinder doctrine, see supra note 213, actually could prevent a
class suit. Since the numbers were too great, indispensable parties would not be
available for the litigation, and the suit would have to be dismissed. However,
courts recognized the injustice that might arise if essential, but impracticably nu-
merous, parties were not bound by the judgment. Accordingly, courts extended
the necessary parties rule by allowing suits to go forward through representation.
See F. CALVERT, A TREATISE UPON THE LAw RESPECTING PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQ.
urry 25-26 (London 1837); Z. CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 211-13; 3B MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE, supra note 13, 23.02[l], at 23-36 to 23-37.
218. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 78, at 709 ("In regard to defendants it
may well be impossible to determine the plaintiff's rights without at the same time
adjudicating or affecting the rights of others adversely situated to him. Here,
there is literally necessary joinder." (emphasis in original)).
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guidelines for certifying defendant classes. In the civil rights
context, defendant classes composed of employers or public
officials may be certified under subdivision (b)(1) if the court
finds that single-party litigation would abridge the rights of
the nonparty class members. Under clause (b)(1)(A), if the
court determines that a plaintiff class would face inconsistent
standards relative to individual defendants, certification is
appropriate.2 19 Under clause (b)(1)(B), if the court deter-
mines that the defendants' interest in the propriety of apply-
ing a challenged statute or agreement would be
compromised by nonclass litigation, certification again is ap-
propriate.220 Although they look to the interests of different
parties, the clauses of subdivision (b)(1) are two sides of the
same coin. Both clauses seek to include necessary parties if
the adjudication would be incomplete in their absence.
2. Certifying the Bilateral Class Action
An illustration may help demonstrate the application of
a necessary parties test under Rule 23. Suppose a state were
to pass a statute which required that all employees in the
state colleges speak only English during working hours.22 1
Bilingual Asian and Latino employees could challenge the
219. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
221. The Fifth Circuit addressed the problem of a speak-English-only rule in
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
The court held that an employer's rule forbidding a bilingual employee to speak
anything but English in public areas while on the job is not discrimination based
on national origin. Id. at 272. Because the plaintiff was capable of speaking Eng-
lish and deliberately chose not to do so in disregard of his employer's rule, his
discharge was not discrimination on the basis of national origin. Id. The court
held that the rule did not violate Title VII as long as it did not create a burden-
some atmosphere of racial and ethnic oppression; additionally, the court held
that because preference for speaking one language over another was not an im-
mutable characteristic, use of an unburdensome rule was not comparable to a rule
discriminating on the basis of race or ethnicity. Id. at 270-71. But cf Saucedo v.
Brothers Wells Serv., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (discharge of employee
for speaking two words of Spanish was based on racial animus and violated Title
VII).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) takes a stricter
approach to speak-English-only rules. The EEOC's guidelines on discrimination
on the basis of national origin state that a rule will be presumed to violate Title
VII if it requires English to be spoken at all times. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1985).
A speak-English-only rule may be allowed only if it precludes communicating in a
foreign language at certain times and if it is required by business necessity. Id.
§ 1606.7(b).
328 [Vol. 33:283
HeinOnline  -- 33 UCLA L. Rev. 326 1985-1986
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
legality of the statute by initiating an action to certify both a
plaintiff class of bilingual employees and a defendant class of
state college officials. In this civil rights bilateral class ac-
tion, the court, after having determined that the Rule 23(a)
requirements had been satisfied for each class, would invoke
Rule 23(b)(2) to certify the plaintiff class and Rule 23(b)(1)
to certify the defendant class.
The court could certify the plaintiff class after an initial
inquiry under Rule 23(a) into the nature of the class and the
class representatives, and after a determination under Rule
23(b)(2) that the putative defendants had acted in a manner
that would make equitable relief appropriate. Since the offi-
cials were charged with enforcing the law, the plaintiff class
would be seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to stop
the enforcement, and certification under subdivision (b)(2)
would be proper.
Employing Rule 23 to certify the defendant class of
state officials, the court first would apply the requirements of
Rule 23(a), paying special attention to the typicality and ade-
quacy of representation requirements. Then the court
would determine whether the unnamed defendant officials
were necessary parties. Using the standards of Rule 23(b)(1)
to certify the defendant class, the court could apply either
clause (b)(1)(A) or clause (b)(1)(B). Under clause (b)(1)(A),
the party opposing the defendant class (i.e., the plaintiff
class) faces potentially incompatible standards of conduct if
inconsistent decisions arise from multiple litigation. De-
pending on their place of work, individual employees might
or might not be forced to monitor their use of another lan-
guage during working hours. Under clause (b)(1)(B), the
members of the defendant class have an equally important
stake in the outcome of the suit. Because they all had been
charged with enforcing the statute, a finding of liability
against one college official would determine the interests of
the other officials in enforcing the statute.
Thus, the true test of whether a defendant class action
should be certified is whether incomplete relief will result
from nonclass adjudication. In those cases in which litiga-
tion against a single defendant would abridge the rights of
the plaintiff class and affect the interests of other similarly
situated defendants, a defendant class should be certified.
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Only when necessary party defendants are included in the
litigation may complete justice be attained.
CONCLUSION
The defendant class action, though still a rarity in mod-
em litigation, can be a useful procedure for expanding the
range of civil rights enforcement. Although a defendant
class action can be applied only in certain situations, courts
should not be reluctant to certify defendant classes when
classwide liability and classwide relief would be appropriate.
Unfortunately, use of the defendant class action in the civil
rights context has led to the judicial misapprehension of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The re-
quirements of Rule 23 regarding defendant class actions
should be accurately construed. By appreciating the history
and the theories underlying class certification, courts may
correctly categorize defendant class actions under Rule 23
and put them to their proper use in enforcing federal civil
rights.
ANGELO N. ANCHETA
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